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COMMENTS
THE RIGHT TO LIVE, THE RIGHT TO
CHOOSE, AND THE UNBORN VICTIMS OF
VIOLENCE ACT
Michael Holzapfel*
INTRODUCTION
Tracy Marciniak was just four days away from delivering her son,
Zachariah, when her life changed forever. On the night of February 8,
1992, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Tracy had a fight with Glendale Black,
her husband at the time.1 Fully aware that Tracy very much wanted the
child, Mr. Black punched her twice in the abdomen, refused to call for
help, and prevented Tracy from doing so.' Eventually he relented, and
Tracy was rushed to the emergency room where she delivered Zachariah
by Caesarian section. Unfortunately, however, by the time she reached
the hospital her child was already dead. Tracy herself was given only
forty-eight hours to live, although she miraculously survived the attack.3
Contrast the case of Tracy Marciniak with that of Shiwana Pace of
Little Rock, Arkansas. On August 26, 1999, just one day before Shiwana
was due to deliver her unborn baby girl, three men brutally beat her,
choked her, clubbed her with a gun and repeatedly kicked her in the
* J.D. 2002, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America; B.A.
1999, College of the Holy Cross. The author thanks Rev. Raymond C. O'Brien for
his guidance and perspective, and classmates, family and friends for their
comments and support.
1. Tracy Marciniak, One Victim or Two?, at
http://www.nrlc.org/UnbornVictims/index.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2002);
Congressman Joe Pitts, Getting Away With Manslaughter, April 24, 2001, at
http://www.house.gov/pitts/press/commentary/042401r-unbornvictims.htm (last
visited Feb. 26, 2002).
2. Pitts, supra note 1.
3. Id.
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abdomen.4 During the attack, one of the assailants allegedly shouted at
her, "Your baby is dying tonight!"5 The attack was masterminded by
Pace's former boyfriend, Erik Bullock, who paid the assailants four
6hundred dollars to kill the unborn child. Pace informed the police that
Bullock previously told her that he did not want children and encouraged
her to have an abortion.7
The attacks against Marciniack and Pace present complicated legal
issues. Because Wisconsin did not have laws protecting unborn victims in
1992, Marciniak's baby was not legally recognized as the victim of a crime.
As a result, her husband was convicted for the assault on his wife, but was
not punished for the loss of the child.' Contrarily, Mr. Bullock and the two
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Traci Shurley, Life Sought for Brothers in '99 Death, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETrE, Dec. 5, 2000, at B1.
7. See id.
8. Id. In response to Tracy Marciniak's case and others like it, Wisconsin
subsequently enacted one of the nation's strongest unborn victims laws. The
Wisconsin statute provides:
(1) Any person, other than the mother, who intentionally destroys the life
of an unborn child may be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not
more than 3 years or both.
(2) Any person, other than the mother, who does either of the following
may be imprisoned not more than 15 years:
(a) Intentionally destroys the life of an unborn quick child; or
(b) Causes the death of the mother by an act done with intent to destroy
the life of an unborn child. It is unnecessary to prove that the fetus was
alive when the act so causing the mother's death was committed.
(3) Any pregnant woman who intentionally destroys the life of her
unborn child or who consents to such destruction by another may be
fined not more than $200 or imprisoned not more than 6 months or both.
(4) Any pregnant woman who intentionally destroys the life of her
unborn child or who consents to such destruction by another may be
imprisoned not more than 2 years.
(5) This section does not apply to a therapeutic abortion which:
(a) Is performed by a physician; and
(b) Is necessary, or is advised by 2 other physicians as necessary, to save
the life of the mother; and
(c) Unless an emergency prevents, is performed in a licensed maternity
hospital.
(6) In this section "unborn child" means a human being from the time of
conception until it is born alive.
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other men who attacked Shiwana Pace were charged with the capital
murder of Ms. Pace's unborn child under a 1999 Arkansas fetal protection
law that allows for murder charges if the fetus is in the twelfth week of
gestation. These conflicting positions illustrate the heart of an issue with
which state legislatures have been struggling for nearly half a century.
Few topics in American jurisprudence have generated as much
ideological debate as the status and rights of the unborn. As attacks
against pregnant women similar to those perpetrated against Marciniack
and Pace continue to occur throughout the country, a greater demand for
protection of unborn victims has arisen at both the state and federal
levels.0 Currently, more than twenty states recognize some form of
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (West 1996). See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
9. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102(13)(b)(Michie Supp. 2001).
10. See, e.g., James H. Burnett III, Charge Will Stand in Feticide Case,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 8, 2000, at 3B. A Wisconsin man was charged with,
among other things, the fetal homicide of his girlfriend's thirty-four week old
fetus. Police and hospital reports showed that the defendant's girlfriend was
admitted to the hospital with cuts, bruises, whip marks and cigarette burns over
much of her body. She arrived at the hospital in labor, and her baby was later
stillborn. See id.
In New York, Joy Schepis, a nurse at a Bronx medical center, was six to eight
weeks pregnant when she was attacked. As she left work one evening, Dr.
Stephen Pack, a former lover and the father of Ms. Schepis's child, plunged a
hypodermic needle filled with the abortion inducing drug methotrexate into her
thigh and buttocks. In the subsequent trial, prosecutors revealed that Dr. Pack, a
married forty-four year old father of two, did not want his family to find out about
his affair with Schepis and had urged her to have an abortion. When she refused,
he attempted to induce an abortion against her will. Because New York precedent
holds that the state legislature did not intend to make the non-abortional killing of
an unborn child a homicide, Dr. Pack could not be tried for assault on the child.
Dr. Pack later pled guilty to two counts of assault and one count of abortion and
was sentenced to two years imprisonment. Ms. Schepis later gave birth to a
healthy baby boy. See Chrisena Coleman, Needle Doc Tells Nurse He's Sorry, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Apr. 21, 2001, at 8.
In California, Nikolay Soltys, a Ukrainian immigrant, brutally stabbed and
murdered six relatives, including his four year old son and his wife who was three
months pregnant at the time. In addition to the murder of the six family members,
Soltys was also charged with the murder of the three month fetus under a 1970
state law. See Harriet Chiang, Rarely Used Law On Fetuses Invoked in Sacramento
Killings, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Sept. 9,2001, at A3.
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criminal liability for harm committed against the unborn." Federal law,
however, continues to subscribe to the "born alive rule" for purposes of
crimes committed against the unborn. This rule holds that a person may
only be charged with homicide, attempted murder or assault if the victim
had been born and was alive at the time of the crime.12 Thus, pursuant to
federal law, if a pregnant woman loses her unborn child as the result of an
assault, the assailant may be prosecuted only for the assault on the mother
and not for the death of the child. While this rule may constitute a
cleaner, less ambiguous approach to dealing with crimes committed
against pregnant mothers, changing views regarding the status of the
unborn, coupled with modern medical advances, have caused the federal
government, as well as many states, to rethink this traditional point of
view.
Congress began its quest to bring unborn victims within the scope of
federal criminal law at the end of the millenium. In 1999 and again in
2001, the House of Representatives passed the Unborn Victims of
Violence Act ("the Act"). This legislation is dramatic in that, if enacted
into law, it would mark the first instance in which federal law recognizes a
fetus as a separate and distinct victim of a crime. The Act provides, in
relevant part, that "whoever engages in conduct that violates any of the
provisions of law listed in subsection (b) and thereby causes the death of,
or bodily injury.., to, a child, who is in utero at the time the conduct
takes place, is guilty of a separate offense under this section." The Act is
noteworthy in that it attaches criminal liability to actions causing death or
bodily injury to an unborn child at any period of gestation, regardless of
viability. Moreover, like all state statutes providing protection for the
unborn, the Act specifically excludes from its scope any consensual
abortion related conduct. 4
11. See infra notes 99-148 and accompanying text.
12. See generally Clark D. Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn Child: The Born
Alive Rule and Other Legal Anachronisms, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 563 (1987).
13. Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2001, H.R. 503, 107th Cong. (2001).
The Act makes no other specification as to the term of the woman's pregnancy.
The term "child in utero" refers to "a member of the species homo sapiens, at any
stage of development, who is carried in the womb." Id.
14. (c)Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit the prosecution-
(1) of any person for conduct relating to an abortion for which
the consent of the pregnant woman, or a person authorized by
law to act on her behalf, has been obtained or for which such
The Right to Live
With the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, the federal government has
thrust itself into the very heart of the debate surrounding rights of the
unborn. This Comment defends the Unborn Victims of Violence Act as a
logical federal response to growing concern about pregnant mothers and
their unborn children. Part I describes the controversy surrounding the
Act in both the public and private spheres and examines the proposed
legislation, analyzing the mens rea standard for conviction, the severity of
punishment imposed, the various crimes that trigger attachment of
criminal liability and exceptions for which liability does not apply. Part II
develops a historical legal analysis regarding protection of the unborn.
This analysis reveals the increasing amount of attention that laws have
afforded the unborn over time. Part III examines the various positions
taken by the states in their treatment of fetal homicide. This section notes
that while several states continue to subscribe to the "born alive rule,"
many. states now recognize a separate and distinct offense for causing the
death of, or bodily injury to, an unborn child in an assault on the mother,
whether or not the death or bodily injury was intended by the attacker.
Part IV compares the Unborn Victims of Violence Act to the fetal
homicide law of Minnesota, a statute closely resembling the federal
legislation. An analysis of how the Minnesota courts have interpreted and
implemented the state's fetal protection statute provides a general model
of how the federal legislation may be implemented. Part V responds to
the argument that the Act threatens the rules of law established by Roe v.
Wade. Nothing in the Act can be construed as detrimental to Roe's
stability. This Comment concludes with the argument that a federal fetal
protection law can and should be passed by Congress without impinging
upon a pregnant woman's constitutionally protected right to decide
whether to conceive and bear a child.
consent is implied by law;
(2) of any person for any medical treatment of the pregnant
woman of her unborn child; or
(3) of any woman with respect to her unborn child. Id.
The element of consent is the key component of this provision. While an abortion
could certainly be classified as a "harm" inflicted upon a fetus, so long as this
"harm" is inflicted with the consent of the mother, it may not be prosecuted as a
criminal offense under the Act.
20021
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I. THE UNBORN VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE ACT AND PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE CONCERNS
A recent study reveals that more than ninety percent of Americans
would support a fetal crime law. 5 Americans overwhelmingly endorse the
concept that a pregnant woman's assailant should be held legally
responsible for any consequent harm to a fetus in addition to any harm
inflicted upon the pregnant mother. 16  Support for imposing stiffer
penalties on such violent acts is widespread. In a national survey of adults,
ninety-three percent support a federal law that would increase
punishment for a perpetrator who inflicts harm upon an "unborn child,"
while eighty-eight percent favor the same law that replaces "unborn child"
with the term "fetus."'
7
The establishment of legal rights of and protections for the unborn is
not a radical concept in American jurisprudence. In equity, 8 property,19
criminal law and torts21 the unborn have received a legal personality.
Moreover, the evolution of the unborn's status in the law has been
15. Lydia Saad, Americans Support Stiffer Penalties for Crimes Against
Pregnant Women: Question Terminology Makes Little Difference, GALLUP
ORGANIZATION, Apr. 25, 2001, available at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr010435b.asp (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
16. See id.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Kyne v. Kyne, 100 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1940) (duty of a father to
support an unborn child); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v.
Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J. 1964) (unborn child's right to medical care, despite
the mother's refusal to consent to a blood transfusion on religious grounds).
19. See, e.g., In re Estate of Holthausen, 26 N.Y.S.2d 140, 143 (1941) (holding
that "it has been the uniform and unvarying decision of all common law courts in
respect of estate matters for at least the past two hundred years that a child en
ventre sa mere is 'born' and 'alive' for all purposes of this benefit."); Cowles v.
Cowles, 56 Conn. 240 (1887) (holding that a child born six months after the
testator's death was, in contemplation of law, "in existence," and was therefore a
beneficiary).
20. See, e.g., State v. Ard, 505 S.E.2d 328 (S.C. 1998) (upholding a sentence of
death for a defendant convicted of killing both his girlfriend and her unborn viable
fetus). Ard is discussed more fully later in this Comment.
21. See, e.g., Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d 926 (Mass. 1967)
(upholding an action brought by an administrator of a nonviable fetus who, as a
result of an automobile accident, was born prematurely and died shortly
thereafter).
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extremely atomistic, espousing legal and medical doctrines rather than
religious beliefs. For example, at the turn of the century, not only did
American courts take the position that no cause of action would lie for
the death of a fetus, but the courts routinely held that a fetus could not
22even be regarded as a separate being. One hundred years later, many
courts and legislatures are taking a more innovative approach. In many
jurisdictions, the unborn enjoy the same legal standing as any other23
person. This observation is particularly strong with respect to the
increase in the amount of fetal homicide laws.
24Fetal homicide laws are now common throughout the United States.
In many jurisdictions, an unborn child now enjoys the same protection
under the law as its mother. Several states now punish actions which cause
death or injury to a fetus (with the exception of abortion) as if such action
had been taken against the mother." A growing sense of respect for both
lives is evident from the increasing amount of convictions of persons who
commit crimes against pregnant women, thereby causing death or bodily
injury to their unborn children.26
While the Unborn Victims of Violence Act may reflect and endorse
what has become a popular state trend, the 1 0 6 h Congress failed to garner
enough support for the Act in the Senate, due in part to executive
opposition to the measure. The Clinton Administration, while supporting
the call for the federal government to play an important role in the
campaign to end violence against women, characterized the Unborn
Victims of Violence Act as "a flawed federal response to the evils of such
violence."27 In a familiar sequence of events, the Act remained stagnant in
22. See, e.g., Deitrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
Deitrich is discussed more fully later in this Comment.
23. In one particularly bold example, the Alabama legislature recently
considered a provision that would allow courts to assign a guardian to represent
unborn children in cases where a minor is seeking an abortion without parental
consent. See Robin Travis, Alabama Considers Appointing Lawyers to Represent
Fetuses, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.12, 2000, at A24.
24. See infra notes 99-148.
25. See, e.g., State v. Merril, 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990). Merrill is discussed
at length later in this Comment.
26. See Liz Townsend, Prosecutors Across the Country File Charges in
Unborn Babies' Deaths, at http://www.nrlc.org/news/1999/NRL1299/homic.htm
(last visited Mar. 1, 2002).
27. The Unborn Victims of Violence Act: Hearing on S. 1673 Before the Senate
2002]
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the Senate during the 107 " Congress, primarily due to many of the same
criticisms.
Critics oppose the Act for three central reasons. The first deals with the
mens rea element of the proposed law - the defendant need not know
that the victim is pregnant. 28 As the Department of Justice states, "the bill
thus makes a potentially dramatic increase in penalty turn on an element
for which liability is strict., 29 Such a radical approach, according to
opponents, "is an unwarranted departure from the ordinary rule that
punishment should respond to culpability, as evidenced by the
defendant's mental state."'
Second, critics attack the legislation for "gratuitously plunging the
federal government into one of the most difficult and complex issues of
religious and scientific consideration and into the midst of a variety of
approaches to handling these issues."" While the states have developed
various methods of dealing with crimes committed against the unborn, the
recognition of the fetus as a separate and distinct victim of a crime is
unprecedented as a matter of federal statute. Opponents thus draw the
apparent conclusion that the federal government should not immerse
32itself in a field which has been largely handled by state legislatures.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Eleanor D. Acheson,
Assistant Attorney General).
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. Id. While criminal statutes requiring no mens rea are generally disfavored,
courts have been willing to impose strict liability if there is a clear legislative intent
to eliminate the mens rea requirement. See, e.g., Reisch v. State, 668 A.2d 970
(Md. App. 1995); In re J.R., 403 N.E.2d 114 (11. App. 1980). For example, "it is
generally held, in the absence of statute, that the defendant's knowledge of the
age of the female is not an essential element of the crime of statutory rape and
therefore it is no defense that the accused reasonably believed that the [victim]
was of the age of consent." 65 AM. JUR. 2D Rape § 84 (2001).
31. Statement of Eleanor D. Acheson, supra note 27.
32. Although a fetus has never been recognized as a separate victim for
purposes of charging a defendant under federal criminal law, the argument that
any recognition of a fetus as a separate and distinct entity is unprecedented as a
matter of federal criminal law is not entirely correct. In one area, federal criminal
law already recognizes that an unborn child is not merely an extension of the
mother. In 1994, Congress codified a longstanding common law doctrine by
enacting an outright prohibition on the execution of any woman who carries an
unborn child. See 18 U.S.C. § 3596 (2000) ("A sentence of death shall not be
The Right to Live
Third, the measure understandably draws fire from those who fear that
its ramifications may overlap into the abortion debate and threaten the
stability of Roe v. Wade33 and its progeny. For example, some of the most
vehement criticism of the Act has come from the Planned Parenthood
Association of America. According to Planned Parenthood, the Unborn
Victims of Violence Act is designed solely with the intent of eroding the
very foundation of Roe v. Wade.3 4 "Cleverly spun to shift the focus away
from violence against a woman to violence against a fetus, this bill does
what the 'Human Life Amendment' and other anti-choice bills could not
do, establish rights of personhood to a fetus, a zygote, blastocyst, or
embryo."35 Similarly, the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights
Action League (NARAL) takes the position that "[the Act's] failure to
even consider the woman makes it clear that this legislation is not meant
to provide greater protections for pregnant women, nor to fight crimes
against them, but rather to forge new legal ground that would eventually
undermine Roe v. Wade. 36 In addition, the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) objects to the bill because the bill would "separate the
woman from her fetus in the eyes of the law. And we believe that such
separation is merely the first step toward eroding a woman's right to
determine the fate of her own pregnancy and to direct the course of her
own health care."37 This slippery slope argument stands at the heart of the
positions adopted by Planned Parenthood, NARAL, the ACLU and
others who see the bill as a threat to the pro-abortion platform."
carried out upon a woman while she is pregnant.")
33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
34. Statement of Gloria Feldt, Planned Parenthood Federation of America,
House Takes Yet Another Step to Erode Roe v. Wade, Sept. 30, 1999 (on file with
author).
35. Id.
36. Press Release, National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action
League, House Passes HR 2436, The So-Called "Unborn Victims of Violence Act,"
Sept. 30, 1999 (on file with author).
37. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, New Battle on
Reproductive Choice Opens As House Panel Considers Fetal Rights Legislation,
July 21, 1999, available at http://www.aclu.org/news/1999/n072199a.html (last
visited Feb. 26, 2002).
38. See, e.g., Pamela B. Stuart, Back-Alley Assault on Abortion Rights:
Proposal Impairs Prosecution of Attacks On Pregnant Women, LEGAL TIMES, Oct.
18, 1999, at 91 (arguing that "H.R. 2436 is the latest example of Congress'
misguided campaign to federalize violent criminal activity. .. ").
2002]
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However, the Act has amassed support in both the public and
governmental sectors. The National Right to Life Committee (NRLC)
heralds the bill as a worthwhile safeguard for the legal status of the
unborn.' 9 Addressing the slippery slope argument that the bill is really an
effort to thwart the authority of Roe v. Wade, the NRLC asks:
Why do pro-abortion groups proclaim that the bill is an attempt
to ban abortion, even though they know abortion is excluded
from the scope of the bill? It seems their greatest fear is not of
what the bill actually does legally, but of how it might encourage
people to think about the unborn child. °
In addition, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops recognizes the
bill as offering
an opportunity to protect the unborn child in a way that clearly
serves the freedom and well-being of his or her mother, by
protecting both parties from violent assault and murder. To
oppose such much needed legislation simply because it
acknowledges a truth about unborn life that almost everyone
already knows anyway, would be a terrible injustice.'
Similar concerns are echoed within Congress. Senator Orin Hatch (R.-
Utah), for example, stated "I cannot imagine why some people would
oppose this bill. The only reason for opposition that I can suppose is that
some in the pro-choice movement believe that our bill draws attention to
the effort to dehumanize, desensitize, and depersonalize the unborn
child.",41 Moreover, Representative Steve Chabot (R. - Ohio) , co-sponsor
of the Act, comments that
39. See National Right to Life Committee, Key Points on the Unborn Victims
of Violence Act, available at
http://www.nrlc.org/Unborn-Victims/keypointsuvva.html (last visited Feb. 26,
2002).
40. National Right to Life Committee, Pro-Abortion Groups Lash Out As
House Panel Approves "Unborn Victims of Violence Act" (on file with author).
According to an NRLC representative, those who condemn the bill "feel
compelled to oppose anything that challenges their nonsensical, ideological
construct, in which an unborn human being is nothing more than a collection of
body tissues." Id.
41. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, NCCB Official Urges Support
for Unborn Victims of Violence Act, Sept. 8, 1999 (on file with author).
42. Silent Victims: The Unborn Victims of Violence Act: Hearing on S. 1673
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Sen.
Orrin Hatch).
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the Act is consistent with the well-settled criminal law doctrine
of transferred intent, which provides that when an individual
acts with the intent to harm one person, and during the course
of the offense hurts another, the law considers the perpetrator
to be just as guilty of harming the second as the first.'
Proponents downplay the Act's relation to the abortion debate by
reiterating that the primary focus of the Act is to ensure punishment for
those who interfere with a mother's right to conceive, carry and bear a
child.
The praises and criticisms of the federal legislation echo similar praises
and criticisms voiced by the legislature, the courts and the public on the
state level. However, before examining how similar legislation has played
out on the state level, it would be beneficial to take a more in-depth look
at the Unborn Victims of Violence Act.
If passed, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act would amend title 18 of
the United States Code and the Uniform Code of Military Justice "to
protect unborn children from assault and murder, and for other
purposes."" There are four essential components to the Act. The first
component sets forth the required mens rea for prosecution under the
Act. Under the proposed legislation:
(a)(1) whoever engages in conduct that violates any of the
provisions of law listed in subsection (b) and thereby causes the
death of, or bodily injury.., to, a child, who is in utero at the
time the conduct takes place, is guilty of a separate offense
under this section.
(2)(A) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the
punishment for that separate offense is the same as the
punishment provided under Federal law for that conduct had
the injury or death occurred to the unborn child's mother.
(B) An offense under this section does not require proof that-
(i) the person engaging in the conduct had knowledge or should
have had knowledge that the victim of the underlying offense
was pregnant; or
(ii) the defendant intended to cause the death of, or bodily
injury to, the unborn child.45
43. Criminal Charges for Harm to a Fetus: Hearing on H.R. 503 Before the
House Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001)(statement of Rep. Steve Chabot).
44. Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2001, H.R. 503, 107th Cong. (2001).
45. Id.
20021
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Thus, culpability turns on an element for which liability is strict; a
defendant would be guilty of causing the death of an unborn child
regardless of whether he knew the woman was pregnant. It is for this
reason that some critics feel that the Act "disregards the Constitution's
promise that citizens are entitled to due process of law .... Courts have
struck down criminal statutes on the grounds that they lack this requisite
mental intent element, and thus punish conduct engaged in innocently."
4
The second component of the Act enumerates the underlying offenses
to which the Act attaches liability. The Act is best viewed as a federal
felony-murder statute which recognizes two victims rather than one. In
order to prosecute a defendant under the Act, his conduct must fall within
one of the sixty-eight documented offenses. The more serious offenses
incorporated into the Act include murder,47 drive-by shootings 8 resisting
arrest,49 damage to property5 and the use or transportation of explosives
with the intent to injure or kill.51 As an extension of existing state law, the
Act also subjects a defendant to federal prosecution if he crosses state
lines with the intent to injure or intimidate his spouse or partner and
thereby causes the death of that spouse's or intimate partner's unborn
child 2
The third component sets forth a very specific exception for abortion-
related conduct. The language of the Act clearly defines three instances in
which the Act may not apply. First, prosecution shall not be permitted of
any person "for conduct relating to an abortion for which the consent of a
pregnant woman, or a person authorized by law to act on her behalf, has
been obtained or for which such consent is implied by law."53 Second,
prosecution shall not be permitted of any person "for any medical
treatment of the pregnant woman or her unborn child. 54 Finally, nothing
in the Act shall be construed to permit the prosecution "of any woman
46. American Civil Liberties Union, Memorandum: Unborn Victims of
Violence Act (S.480/ H.R. 503), March 14, 2001, at
http://www.aclu.org/congress/1031401b.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 111 (2000).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 36 (2000).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 111 (2000).
50. 18 U.S.C § 247 (2000).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 844(d) (2000).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (2000).
53. Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2001, H.R. 503, 107th Cong. (2001).
54. Id.
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with respect to her unborn child."55 Thus, the Act gives legislative
affirmation to the judicial principles established in Roe v. Wade.
The fourth and perhaps the most controversial component of the Act
lies in its definition of "unborn child." According to the legislation, "the
term 'unborn child' means a child in utero, and the term 'child in utero' or
'child, who is in utero' means a member of the species homo sapiens, at
any stage of development, who is carried in the womb."56 As previously
discussed, the idea of attaching rights of personhood to an unborn child at
any stage of development for purposes of assigning criminal liability for
causing the child's death is disturbing to those who think such a measure
threatens the rationale of Roe v. Wade.
II. HISTORICAL LEGAL ANALYSIS: RECOGNIZING FETAL RIGHTS
Recognition of an unborn child as a separate and distinct being from its
mother is a concept that has slowly but definitively gained support in the
common law.57 Authorities such as seventeenth century scholar Sir
Edward Coke, and eighteenth century scholar Sir William Blackstone,
had an early impact on American law. Coke and Blackstone developed a
theory regarding death or injury to the unborn that is still accepted in
many jurisdictions today. Coke reasoned:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise
killeth it in her wombe; or if a man beat her, whereby the childe
dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a
great misprision, and no murder; but if the childe be born alive
and dieth of the potion, battery, or other cause, this is murder:
for in law it is accounted a reasonable creature, in rerum natura,
when it is born alive ......
Comparatively, in the eighteenth century, Blackstone reiterated the words
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. It is arguable that the debate over the status of the unborn predates even
the evolution of the English Common Law. During the eras of Greek and Roman
preeminence, both Plato and Aristotle advocated abortion as a method of
population control. Moreover, any prosecution brought during these eras for the
death of a pregnant woman or her unborn child was most likely a simple property
claim by the pregnant woman's father. See G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 148 (1957); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130 (1973).
58. E. COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
(1628)(cited in Williams v. State, 561 A.2d 216 (Md. 1989)).
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of Coke in his Commentaries:
[T]he person killed must be 'a [sic] reasonable creature in being,
and under the king's peace, at the time of the killing... To kill a
child in its mother's womb, is now no murder, but a great
misprision: but if the child be born alive, and dieth by reason of
the potion or bruises it received in the womb, it seems, by the
better opinion, to be murder in such as administered or gave
them. 9
According to Blackstone, the killing of an unborn child was nevertheless
recognized as a "barbarity." 60 Blackstone affirmed his position that "[o]f
crimes injurious to the persons of private subjects, the most principal and
important is the offense of taking away that life, which is the immediate
gift of the great Creator; and of which therefore no man can be entitled to
deprive himself or another.... . 6 However, this right of personal security
did not attach from the moment of conception, but at quickening, the time
the mother first feels the child move in her womb.62
Thus, Coke and Blackstone developed the legal concept of the "born
alive rule." While it was a particularly heinous crime for a person to
attack a pregnant woman, thereby killing or inflicting serious bodily injury
upon her unborn child, there was no cause of action for the child's death
or pre-natal bodily injury unless the child was born alive. The "born alive"
61
rule is still good law in several jurisdictions today.
The views of Coke and Blackstone subsequently entered English
common law, particularly in wrongful death statutes. In one of the earliest
cases dealing with the subject, Justice Lord Ellenborough wrote that "in a
civil Court, the death of a human being could not be complained of as an
injury."64 Essentially, the cause of action died with the victim. It was not
long, however, before English courts recognized the flawed reasoning
behind this principle. As a result, in 1846, Parliament passed the Fatal
Accidents Act, commonly known as Lord Campbell's Act. Although Lord
Campbell's Act permitted recovery for damages by the close relatives of a
59. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 155 (vol. 4
Wayne Morrison ed., 2001).
60. Id. at 313 (discussing the execution of pregnant women).
61. Id. at 139-140.
62. "[F]or barely, with child, unless it be alive in the womb is not sufficient."
Id. at 314.
63. See infra notes 98-100.
64. Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808).
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victim who was tortiously killed, it did not cover prenatal torts.65
In contrast to the passage of Lord Campbell's Act in Great Britain,
American courts were reluctant to abandon such a well established rule of
law. At least initially, the lack of support for wrongful death actions was
evident in several jurisdictions." It did not take long, however, for
American state legislatures to begin enacting statutes similar to Lord
67Campbell's Act. The first such statute was enacted in New York in 1847.
Over time, every state enacted a statute permitting recovery for wrongful
death. Inevitably, when a cause of action for wrongful death became a
matter of statutory right, the question arose whether prenatal torts were
beyond the scope of these laws.
The issue of recovery for prenatal injuries was first dealt with by an
American court in Massachusetts in 1884. In Dietrich v. Inhabitants of
Northampton,69 a woman approximately five months pregnant slipped and
fell as the result of a defect in a highway. In denying the plaintiff a cause
of action, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes held that "as the unborn child
was a part of the mother at the time of the injury, and any damage to it
which was not too remote to [deny recovery altogether] was recoverable
by the mother."70 Justice Holmes's view that the fetus was not an
independent biological entity from its mother-known as the "single
entity" theory-was followed for over half a century as an unquestioned
authority on the issue of recovery for prenatal injury.
It was not until the turn of the century that judges began to question
the rule barring recovery for prenatal death or injury. In Allaire v. St.
Luke's Hospital,71 the majority adhered to Justice Holmes's "single entity"
rule and denied recovery for a mother whose child was born grossly
deformed due to the hospital's negligence. However, Justice James Boggs
65. See Gary A. Meadows, Note, Wrongful Death and the Lost society of the
Unborn, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 99, 100-101 (1992). For an excellent historical review
of prenatal torts see Note, The Unborn Child and the Constitutional Conception of
Life, 56 IOWA L. REV. 994 (1971).
66. See T.A. Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13
VAND. L. REV 605, 617 (1960).
67. See 22A AM. JUR. 2D Death § 7 (1988).
68. See id.
69. 138 Mass. 14 (1884), overruled by Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 225
N.E.2d 926 (Mass. 1967).
70. Deitrich, 138 Mass. at 17.
71. 56 N.E. 638 (I11. 900).
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pointed out in his dissenting opinion that, although no court had ever
awarded a plaintiff damages for injuries sustained while en ventre sa mere
(literally, "in the mother's womb"), "an adjudicated case is not
indispensable to establish a right to recover under the rules of common
law.",7' Dismissing the idea that stare decisis should preclude establishing a
new right under common law, Justice Boggs opined that:
If in delivering a child an attending physician, acting for a
compensation, should wantonly or by actionable negligence
injure the limbs of the infant, and thereby cause the child,
although born alive and living, to be maimed and crippled in
body or members, it would be abhorrent to every impulse of
justice or reason to deny to such a child a right of action against
such physician to recover damages for the wrongs and injuries
inflicted by such physician.73
The dissenting opinion of Justice Boggs in Allaire marked the beginning
of a movement away from Deitrich and the "single entity" principle.
It was not until 1946, however, that an American court completely
departed from Deitrich. In Bonbrest v. Kotz, 74 the District of Columbia
District Court held that the single-entity theory was a "contradiction in
terms., 75 Pointing out that, in property law, a child en ventre sa mere was
regarded as a separate and distinct human being from conception, the
court posed the question,
Why [is a child considered] 'part' of the mother under the law of
negligence and a separate entity and person in that of
property and crime? ... What right is more inherent, and
more sacrosanct, than that of an individual in his
possession and enjoyment of his life, his limbs and his
body?
76
Coupling this fundamental right to life with the contradictory views of a
fetus under the law of property and the law of negligence, the court held
that "it is but natural justice that a child, if born alive and viable77 should
be allowed to maintain an action in courts for injuries wrongfully
72. Id. at 640 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 642.
74. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
75. Id. at 140.
76. Id. at 142.
77. This concept of viability as a prerequisite for a cause of action is discussed
later in the Comment. See infra notes 103-108 and accompanying text.
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committed upon its person while in the womb of its mother."78
Despite adherence to the "born alive" rule, the Bonbrest court made a
landmark ruling by wholly abandoning the reasoning of Deitrich. The
majority concluded its opinion with an interesting observation: "[t]he law
is presumed to keep pace with the sciences and medical science certainly
has made progress since 1884." 79 In other words, the law is not static, but
is constantly evolving, shaped and molded by the changing circumstances
of the times. The Bonbrest court may not have realized the significance of
this observation, as courts continued to struggle with similar issues more
than fifty years later.
The Bonbrest ruling applied only to a cause of action on behalf of a
viable fetus. The question of whether viability should represent the
threshold for attaching liability for death or injury inflicted upon an
unborn child has proven a difficult one for courts and legislatures to
answer. Although American common law outgrew the untenable
positions developed by Blackstone and Coke and advanced by cases like
Deitrich and Allaire, courts also became wary of over-extending the new
doctrine applied by Bonbrest. The child in Bonbrest had already survived
far beyond the viability stage and was subsequently born alive. Therefore,
the court limited its holding to these facts.
Today, every jurisdiction permits recovery for prenatal injuries if the
child is born alive.80 While some jurisdictions do not permit a wrongful
death action for the death of an unborn child, the majority of jurisdictions
permit a wrongful death action if the unborn child has reached viability.81
It was not long before courts began to encounter the issues of whether the
Bonbrest holding could be extended to cases in which a child sustained
injuries prior to viability, or sustained post-viability injuries but was
subsequently stillborn.
This question was most notably taken up by the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia in Farley v. Sartin.2 In Farley, the plaintiff's
pregnant wife was killed in an automobile accident. The mother of the
unborn child was approximately eighteen weeks pregnant at the time of
78. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 142 (quoting Montreal Tramways v. Leveille,
1933, 4 Dom.L.R. 337).
79. Id. at 143.
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 (1982).
81. See id.
82. 466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995).
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the accident, and the child was neither large enough nor developed
enough to survive outside the womb.83 Under West Virginia state law, a
wrongful death action could be maintained "whenever the death of a
person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default. ... " 8 4 Noting
that the common definition of "child" includes an unborn person, the
court held that the phrase "unborn child" encompassed all stages of
• 85
development after conception. The court concluded that the plaintiff
could maintain a cause of action under the West Virginia wrongful death
statute for the death of the unborn child regardless of viability.81
In reaching its decision, the Farley court highlighted four arguments
typically relied upon by jurisdictions that deny a wrongful death action for
a child en ventre sa mere. The first argument was the lack of precedent
allowing for such an action. Second was the related argument that courts
should continue to follow Justice Holmes's "single entity" theory. Third,
some courts feared that allowing such claims would lead to fraudulent
claims and difficulty in proving damages. Finally, some courts felt that this
was a matter for the legislature to decide."'
The Farley court rebutted each of these arguments. According to
Farley, the first argument was simply erroneous, as a considerable amount
of precedent for allowing wrongful death actions for a child en ventre sa
mere had accumulated over time.8 Second, the "single entity" theory has
been thoroughly discredited by advances in modern medicine.89 Third, the
risk of fraudulent claims did not justify barring legitimate claims.90 Finally,
the court felt it was incumbent upon the judiciary to supplement the law
in the absence of specific legislative intent.91
83. See id. at 523.
84. W. VA. CODE § 55-7-5 (2000).
85. Farley, 466 S.E. 2d at 524.
86. See id. at 525 (emphasis added).
87. See, e.g., Santana v. Zilog, Inc., 95 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 1996). In Santana, the
court reasoned that "[a]lthough viability may be a somewhat arbitrary distinction
in the wrongful death context, it does provide a logical point at which to halt
further judicial extension of the cause of action. Any further expansion of
potential liability seems most properly left to the Idaho legislature, as the majority
suggests." Id. at 786.
88. Farley, 466 S.E.2d. at 529.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 530.
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Thus, the Farley court reasoned that a tortious injury suffered by a
nonviable fetus, subsequently born alive, was compensable and must be
treated no differently from an injury inflicted upon a viable child,
subsequently born alive.92 The court's logic suggested that retaining
viability as the threshold at which liability attaches promoted inequitable
and potentially arbitrary rulings:
In our judgement, justice is denied when a tortfeasor is
permitted to walk away with impunity because of the
happenstance that the unborn child had not yet reached viability
at the time of death. The societal and parental loss is egregious
regardless of the state of fetal development. Our concern
reflects the fundamental value determination that life-old,
young, and prospective-should not be wrongfully taken away.93
From this holding the court was able to extrapolate a valuable rule of
logic: should the basis for recovery turn on such an arbitrary and
imprecise factor as viability, the law would regress into the days of Coke
and Blackstone and produce the same inequitable rulings that resulted
before such wrongful death statutes were passed.
This brief history of the common law's treatment of the unborn -
from Blackstone's "born alive" rule, to the "single entity" theory of
Justice Holmes, to the rejection of that theory by Bonbrest, to the
extension of Bonbrest in Farley -illustrates the issues and concerns that
currently surround the Unborn Victims of Violence Act. A historical
analysis of the common law's treatment of the unborn over time rebuts
the argument that the Act stands for an unfounded, radical approach to
dealing with crimes committed against pregnant women. This analysis
shows that the Act stems from a line of cases which long predate Roe v.
Wade. While the Act may be unprecedented as a matter of federal law,
implementation of the Act can more plausibly be viewed as a logical,
federal extension of a trend that has been developing over more than a
century at the state level.
Moreover, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act attempts to avoid some
of the problems that periodically surface in states punishing harms against
the unborn. Consider the following scenario: Woman A is twenty weeks
pregnant. Woman B is twenty-eight weeks pregnant. Both women are
assaulted (for purposes of argument, assume that this is a federal assault
charge) and, as a result, subsequently deliver stillborn babies. While both
92. Id. at 532.
93. Id. at 533.
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women experience a tremendous loss, Woman A's child, by medical
standards, has not yet reached viability. To allow a cause of action for the
death of Woman B's child but not for Woman A's child would be a gross
injustice. Such an arbitrary and inequitable result is precisely what the
Farley court wished to avoid. Congress attempts to remedy this
discrepancy by applying the Unborn Victims of Violence Act to instances
in which death or injury is inflicted upon a child at any period of
gestation.
III. STATE FETAL HOMICIDE LAWS
The holding of Bonbrest still applies today: "the law is presumed to
keep pace with the sciences ... ,,94 Application of this truth is evident
when tracing the common law's treatment of the unborn from the days of
Blackstone to modern times. Modern medical developments greatly
increase the probability that a child will survive and develop outside the
womb even prior to the typical viability threshold of twenty-seven
weeks95 It follows that the state's interest in protecting and preserving
both the life of the fetus and the life of the mother should increase
proportionally. Yet, several states do not recognize unborn children as
human victims of violent crimes,% and those states that do afford
protection to the unborn in their criminal statues differ with regard to the
threshold at which criminal liability should be attached.97 These
differences are echoed by those who oppose passage of the Unborn
Victims of Violence Act into law.
Before addressing the argument's for and against the federal legislation,
it is beneficial to examine how similar legislation is received by state
courts.98 Currently, a total of thirty-two states recognize some form of
94. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 143.
95. Viability is presumed to occur at twenty-seven weeks of gestation,
assuming an otherwise healthy fetus, and is presumed not to occur prior to twenty
weeks. The American Medical Association characterizes the time between twenty
and twenty-seven weeks as a "gray zone" in which some fetuses may be viable and
others are not. See Janet E. Gans Epner, Ph.D, et al., Late Term Abortion, JAMA,
Aug. 26, 1998, at 724.
96. See infra notes 98-100.
97. See infra notes 103-150 and accompanying text.
98. For an excellent analysis of state fetal homicide laws, see Sandra L. Smith,
Note, Fetal Homicide: Woman or Fetus As Victim? A Survey of Current State
Approaches And Recommendations For Future State Application, 41 WM. & MARY
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criminal liability for harms inflicted either upon the unborn child itself, or
upon the mother. Jurisdictions may be divided into one of three
categories: those states which follow the "born alive" rule; those states
which criminalize harm to fetuses other than abortion; and those states
which subscribe to the "born alive with a caveat" rule.
A. "Born Alive" States
As of January 1, 2002, eighteen states continue to subscribe to the
"born alive" rule, either by express statutory language or through judicial
interpretation. Eight of these states have criminal statutes explicitly
defining a "person" as one who is born and is alive.99 Eight other states
either define "person" or refer to "persons" in their statutes,' °° but their
courts have held that these definitions do not encompass fetuses.'0' Two
states define "person" and "human being" in their statues, but their courts
have not expressly ruled on whether these definitions include fetuses.0
2
As such, there is a rebuttable presumption that the common law rule
applies in these two states. Courts in Alabama, Kentucky, Maryland, New
Jersey, New York and Texas, though maintaining the "born alive" rule,
have held that if a fetus is injured before birth, is born alive, and then dies,
its deaths can be prosecuted as a homicide.' 3
L. REV. 1845 (2000).
99. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-1(2) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.140 (Michie
2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-101(2) (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-700
(Michie 1999 & Supp. 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(28) (2001); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-302(2) (1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.005(3) (1999); TEXAS PENAL CODE
ANN. § 1.07(a)(26) (Vernon 1994).
100. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-3(1) (West 2001); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507-010 (Michie 1999); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27 § 407 (1996); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2C:1-14(g), :11-2 (West 1995); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.00, 125.05
(Consol. 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1999); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13, § 5301(4)
(Supp. 1998); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-1 (1997). See Smith, supra note 98 at 1848-49.
101. See State v. Anonymous, 516 A.2d 156 (Conn. Super. 1986); Hollis v.
Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983); Williams v. State, 561 A.2d 216 (Md.
1989); State in Interest of A.W.S., 440 A.2d 1144 (N.J. Super.A.D. 1981); People v.
Joseph, 496 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Co.Ct. 1985); State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1989);
State v. Oliver, 563 A.2d 1002 (Vt. 1989); State ex rel. Atkinson v. Wilson, 332
S.E.2d 807 (W.Va. 1984).
102. See IDAHO CODE §§ 18-101, 4001, 4006 (1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, §§ 2(20), 201 (West 1993). See Smith, supra note 98 at 1849.
103. See Clarke v. State, 23 So. 671 (Ala. 1898) (upholding the defendant's
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B. States Criminalizing Actions Against the Unborn
Twenty-four states criminalize actions against the fetus. However, the
point at which each jurisdiction attaches criminal liability varies widely.
At what gestational stage should an unborn child be recognized as a
"person" for purposes of assigning criminal liability? Not surprisingly,
modern medical jurisprudence continues to refer to viability as the
threshold stage of fetal development for legal purposes. °4 In the landmark
decision of Roe v. Wade,1°5 the Supreme Court defined viability as the
period at which "the fetus then presumably has the capability of
meaningful life outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid.
'0
Viability usually occurs at the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy, but may
occur as early as the twenty-fourth week.0 7
Six states criminalize homicides of viable fetuses. Three of these states
do so by specifically protecting fetuses with homicide statutes.1 0 In the
conviction for second-degree murder of a fetus after the defendant beat the
mother); Jones v. Commonwealth, 830 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1992) (upholding a
conviction for second degree manslaughter during the operation of a motor
vehicle); Williams v. State, 550 A.2d 722 (Md. 1988) (upholding a conviction for
manslaughter by bow and arrow); State v. Anderson, 343 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1975)
(upholding the defendant's conviction of the murder of twin fetuses); People v.
Hall, 557 N.Y.S.2d 879 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (upholding a conviction for second
degree manslaughter); Cuellar v. State, 957 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)
(upholding a conviction for manslaughter). Smith, supra note 98 at 1850.
104. See Epner, supra note 95 at 724.
105. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
106. Id. at 160.
107. See Epner, supra note 95 at 724-725.
108. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-42-1-1(4), -42-1-6 (Michie Supp. 1999); MICH.
COMp. LAws ANN. § 750.322 (West 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-214 (1997).
The Michigan statute defines the willful killing of an "unborn quick child" as
manslaughter, but the state's supreme court has held that this statute refers to a
"viable" child. See also Larkin v. Calahan, 208 N.W.2d 176 (Mich. 1973). Larkin
defines a "viable child" as
an unborn child whose heart is beating, who is experiencing electronically
measurable brain waives, who is discernibly moving, and who is so far
developed and matured as to be capable of surviving the trauma of birth
with the aid of the usual medical care and facilities available in the
community.
Id. at 180.
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other three states'09 the courts have interpreted their respective homicide
statutes to include an unborn viable fetus as a person under these laws." °
South Carolina illustrates how drastically that state's law changed over
the last twenty years. Prior to 1984, South Carolina subscribed to the born
alive rule. The state abandoned this rule, however, in its 1984 decision,
State v. Home." In Home, the defendant was convicted of assault and
battery with intent to kill and involuntary manslaughter. Horne stabbed
his estranged wife, who survived, but her full term viable fetus died. " ' The
court determined that the fetus was the victim of the defendant's
transferred intent toward the mother, and held that a viable fetus was a
"person" within the state's statutory definition of murder.
Even more compelling was the recent South Carolina case of State v.
Ard.14 In Ard, the defendant shot his eight and a half month pregnant
girlfriend after expressing his desire to a confidant that he wished that his
girlfriend and the child were dead.' The defendant's girlfriend died from
a single gunshot wound to her forehead.!M The unborn child survived for
approximately six to eight minutes before dying from lack of oxygen.117
109. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 1 (West 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, §§ 105, 711 (West 1983); CODE LAWS S.C. ANN. § 16-3-10 (1985).
110. See Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 536 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1989); Hughes
v. State, 868 P.2d 730 (Okla. Crim. 1994); State v. Horne, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C.
1984). But see Starks v. Oklahoma, 18 P.3d 342 (Okla. 2001). In Starks, the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that while a viable fetus is a human being for
purposes of the state's homicide law, a viable fetus could not be construed as a
human being for purposes of the Oklahoma Children's Code. In Hughes v. State,
868 P.2d 730 (Okla. 1994), the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that a
fetus may be the subject of a homicide because medical science may provide proof
of whether the fetus was alive at the time of a defendant's action. 868 P.2d at 732.
However, the Starks court declined to extend the same protection to a fetus under
the Children's Code because "medical science cannot provide evidence regarding
whether a fetus might be emotionally, mentally, physically or intellectually
deprived within the definitions of terms contained in the Oklahoma Children's
Code." 18 P.3d at 345.
111. 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984).
112. Id. at 704.
113. Id. at 704.
114. 505 S.E.2d 328 (S.C. 1998).
115. Id. at 330.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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Extending the state's precedent established in Home, the Ard court held
that "it would be inconsistent to conclude a viable fetus is a person for
purposes of murder, but not a person for purposes of a statutory
aggravating circumstance to murder."' "8 Consequently, the court held that
"the trial judge properly held that the murder of a viable fetus could
subject a defendant to the death penalty."'' 9
Six states criminalize actions against "quick" fetuses. Quickening is
defined as the period prior to viability when the mother first feels the
fetus move in her womb - usually between the sixteenth and eighteenth
week of pregnancy."" Florida, Mississippi, Nevada, Rhode Island and
Washington punish the willful or intentional killing of an unborn quick
child as manslaughter. 2' Georgia punishes such an action as feticide. 22
While the courts in these states have been largely successful in123
obtaining convictions under these statutes, problems arise with adopting
quickening as the threshold for liability. Quickening is a medically
primitive term of art. Coined prior to the thirteenth century, it was
employed primarily within the religious and philosophical debate as to
when life "begins," or when a being became infused with a soul, rather
118. Id. at 331.
119. Id. The Unborn Victims of Violence Act does not purport to take the
law to this particular extreme. The legislation would impose on a defendant the
same penalty for causing the death of or bodily injury to the fetus as would have
been imposed had the death or bodily injury occurred to the child's mother,
although the death penalty may not be imposed.
120. See Clark D. Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn Child: The Born Alive
Rule and Other Legal Anachronisms, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 563, 567 (1987).
121. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37
(West Supp. 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.210 (Michie 2001); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-23-5 (2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060 (West 2000).
122. See GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-393.1 (2001).
123. See, e.g., Brinkley v. State, 322 S.E.2d 49 (Ga. 1984) (holding that the
description "quick" in the state's feticide statute was not unconstitutionally
vague); State v. Willis, 457 So.2d 959, 960 (Miss. 1984) (holding, in a case of first
impression, that manslaughter of a fetus did not merge with the charge of murder
of the mother, and the defendant could be charged with murder in the mother's
death and manslaughter in the fetus's death); State v. Amaro, 448 A.2d 1257,
1259-1260 (R.I. 1982) (holding that the state's homicide statute did not apply to
fetuses in light of the state feticide statute that specifically punished the "willful
killing of an unborn quick child").
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than for any biological or medical purpose.24 Because developments in
medical science have allowed physicians to determine more precisely the
stage of a fetus's development, the quickening distinction has gradually
disappeared from the statutory law of most states. 25 The Supreme Court
itself has dismissed quickening as having little medical significance
126
today.
Of the remaining states that criminalize actions against the unborn, one
state, Arkansas, establishes the culpability threshold at twelve weeks of
fetal development. Like South Carolina, Arkansas originally adhered to
the born alive rule. In 1987, in a response to the Arkansas Supreme Court
decision in Meadows v. State,128 the state legislature enacted a statute
enlarging the crime of battery to include injuries to pregnant woman
resulting in a miscarriage.' 9 The Arkansas legislation is unique in
protecting both women and fetuses. Moreover, in further response to the
Meadows decision, the Arkansas legislature recently enacted a
comprehensive fetal protection act and amended the Arkansas Code to
expand the definition of "person" to include fetuses at twelve weeks of
development. 3°
One state, California, does not specify by statute the applicable stage ofd . .131
development, but the California judiciary has established seven to eight
124. See generally Stephen C. Hicks, The Right to Life in Law: The Embryo
and Fetus, the Body and Soul, The Family and Society, 19 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 805
(1992).
125. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 138-40 (1973). See also, Larkin v.
Calahan, 208 N.W.2d 176, 180 (Mich. 1973). The Michigan Supreme Court
employed the same logic in reaching the conclusion that the state's provision in
the manslaughter statute for the killing of an unborn quick child refers to an
unborn viable child.
126. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 160.
127. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102(13)(b) (Supp. 2001). However, for
purposes of capital murder and drunk driving, the term "person", as used in the
statute, includes "an unborn child in utero at any stage of development." See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-1-102(13)(B)(i)(a)(Supp. 2001).
128. 722 S.W.2d 584 (Ark. 1987) (holding that a fetus was not a person for
purposes of the manslaughter statute).
129. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-201(5)(A)(1997).
130. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102(13)(B) (Supp. 2001).
131. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1999); see Smith, supra note 98 at
1859.
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weeks as the threshold. Under the state statute, murder is defined as
"the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice
aforethought.', 3 3 In People v. Davis,134 the California Supreme Court held
that viability is not an element of fetal murder under state law. 3 5 Relying
extensively on the testimony of medical experts regarding the statistical
probability of a fetus surviving outside of the womb at various periods of
gestation, the Davis court held that the third party killing of an unborn
fetus with malice aforethought constituted murder "as long as the state
can show that the fetus has progressed beyond the embryonic stage of
seven to eight weeks.'
36
States also use fertilization or conception as the threshold for attaching
criminal liability. Seven states penalize harm inflicted upon the unborn at
fp M r1 3 7 Pnnyv a1 3 8 Loisan, 3 9fertilization or conception: 142ssourl, Pennsylvania, Louisiana, North40 " 141 14' 143
Dakota,' Illinois, Minnesota and Wisconsin. As explained later in
the Comment, the Minnesota statute is the state statute most similar to
the federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act.
Finally, three states criminalize harmful actions against a fetus, but do
not specify any particular gestation period: Arizona,'" South Dakota
145
and Utah. 46 The wording of these statutes has proven deceptively
ambiguous. For example, in State v. Brewer147 the Supreme Court of
Arizona, in upholding the trial court's dismissal of a charge of first degree
murder of a fetus, held that the state's fetal manslaughter statute
148
132. See People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994).
133. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1999).
134. 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 603.
137. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (West 2000).
138. PA. CONS. SWAT. ANN. §§ 3203, 2603 (West 2000).
139. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:2(11) (West 1997).
140. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17.1-01 (1996).
141. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/9-1.2 (West 1993).
142. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.266 (West 1987).
143. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 940.04(b)(6) (West 1996).
144. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13 - 1103(A)(5)(West 2001).
145. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2(50A)(Michie 1998).
146. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201(1999).
147. 826 P.2d 783 (Ariz. 1992).
148. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13 - 1103(A)(5) (West Supp. 1998). The
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precludes the state from prosecuting a defendant for the death of an
unborn child under the homicide statutes.9
We can assume that the legislature, when it drew up this statute
in 1983, considered the complex issue of when the murder
statute should apply and, when confronted with the complex
legal, medical and moral questions involved in this issue, chose
to create a lesser offense to murder, i.e. manslaughter, when the
death of an unborn fetus is involved. We are not dealing with an
ancient statute, we are dealing with a relatively new
pronouncement by the legislature on what the law is.
The court concluded that, while the defendant could be convicted for the
murder of the mother, the legislature did not intend such a severe offense
to apply to causing the death of an unborn child. 5'
C. States Subscribing to the "Born Alive With A Caveat" Rule
Several states adhere to the born alive rule, but nevertheless
criminalize certain acts against pregnant women resulting in miscarriage
or injury to the fetus."' Thus, the rule adopted by these states may more
appropriately be termed "born alive with a caveat." These jurisdictions
recognize the mother, not the fetus, as the victim in order to avoid the
question of whether the fetus is a person. For example, New Hampshire
specifically exempts the fetus from protection under its homicide laws.'
After considering legislation that would include fetuses in the vehicular
homicide statute, the legislature enacted laws permitting a felony
prosecution for an assault by a defendant who "purposely or knowingly
causes injury" to a pregnant woman resulting in miscarriage, without
Arizona manslaughter statute states that a person commits manslaughter by
"[k]nowingly or recklessly causing the death of an unborn child at any stage of its
development by any physical injury to the mother of such child which would be
murder if the death of the mother had occurred." Id.
149. See Brewer, 826 P.2d at 805.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-101.1 (Michie 1998); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-
2-502(a)(iv)(Michie 1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 631:1(I)(c), :2(I)(e)(1999);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3440, -3441 (1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.8 (West Supp.
2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.01-07 (West 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11
§§ 222(22), 605-06, 612(a)(9)(Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-31(11), -32.1, -
51.2 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1999). See Smith, supra note 98 at 1865.
153. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1(IV) (1996).
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specifying the fetus's gestational age. 5 4 Although these statutes recognize
the termination of a pregnancy as a cause for imposing criminal liability,
organizations such as the National Right to Life Committee criticize these
laws as "gravely deficient, because they do not recognize unborn children
as victims, nor allow justice to be done on their behalf."'55
Twenty-four jurisdictions criminalize harms against the unborn, either
by statute or by judicial interpretation. An additional eight jurisdictions,
while not recognizing the fetus as a separate victim, view the termination
of a pregnancy as a separate offense. In light of the positions adopted by a
majority of the states, it is arguable that the "born alive rule" no longer
has a place in American jurisprudence, and it seems plausible that it will
one day be phased out completely. States possess a fundamental interest
in preserving the lives of their citizens. This fundamental interest is
manifested by the thirty-two jurisdictions that punish acts resulting in the
death of, or harm to, an unborn child. One state, South Carolina, even
goes so far as to consider the death of a fetus an aggravating circumstance
warranting the death penalty in instances in which an assailant kills both
the mother and her unborn child. The Unborn Victims of Violence Act
does not take such drastic measures, but the motives behind the federal
legislation are similar: the government has a fundamental interest in
preserving life - young, old, and prospective.
A comparison between the proposed Unborn Victims of Violence Act
and state statutes similar in structure and scope provides insight in to how
the federal legislation may function if passed into law. The judicial
reception of the Minnesota statute furnishes a clear case study in this
regard.
IV. MINNESOTA AS A REFLECTION OF THE UNBORN VICTIMS OF
VIOLENCE ACT
The Minnesota Crimes Against Unborn Children Act defines "unborn
child" as the "unborn offspring of a human being conceived, but not yet
born.' 5 6 As with the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, the Minnesota Act
applies to any child "in utero" from the point of conception or
154. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 631:1(I)(c), :2(I)(e)(1999). See Smith, supra
note 97 at 1865-67.
155. National Right to Life Committee, Key Points on the Unborn Victims of
Violence Act, National Right to Life Committee, Oct. 8, 1999 (on file with author).
156. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.266(a)(West 1987).
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fertilization. The Minnesota Act lists various offenses which constitute
murder of an unborn child in the first, second or third degree;
manslaughter of an unborn child in the first or second degree; assault on
an unborn child in the first, second or third degree; or felony murder or
injury of an unborn child. As with the federal legislation, the Minnesota
Act provides that the penalty for a violation of one of these laws
protecting the unborn shall be substantially similar to the penalty that
would have been imposed had the offense been committed against the
mother.17 Finally, the Minnesota Act, like the federal act, incorporates by
reference provisions in the state code safeguarding a woman's
constitutionally protected right to procure an abortion.5 8 Under the state
statute, neither the mother nor her treating physician may be subject to
prosecution for conduct relating to an abortion performed in accordance
with state law and with the mother's express or implied consent. 9
Four years after the enactment of the Crimes Against Unborn Children
Act, the Supreme Court of Minnesota decided the case of State v.
Merrill.6' ° In Merrill the defendant was charged with the shooting death of
his girlfriend and her twenty-eight day old embryo. 16' The defendant was
subsequently indicted for the death of his girlfriend's embryo under the
two statutes entitled, respectively, "Murder of an Unborn Child in the
First Degree" and "Murder of an Unborn Child in the Second Degree."
On appeal, the defendant challenged the statute on two grounds. First, he
argued that the statute violated the Equal Protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade, by failing to distinguish between viable fetuses and embryos, and
by treating fetuses and embryos as persons.' 62 Second, the defendant
argued that the statute was void for vagueness. 63 The Supreme Court of
Minnesota dismissed both arguments.
In rejecting the defendant's equal protection argument, the court
pointed out that the law by no means treats similarly situated persons
dissimilarly. '6 The defendant advanced the argument that state laws
157. See id. § 609.2661.
158. See id. § 609.269.
159. Id. § 145.412.
160. 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990).
161. Id. at 320.
162. Id. at 321.
163. Id. at 322.
164. Id. at 321.
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exposed him to conviction as a murderer during the first trimester of
pregnancy, while others who might intentionally destroy a nonviable
fetus, such as a woman who obtains a legal abortion and the doctor who
performs it, are not murderers. 16 The court found the disparity to be
valid:
The situations are not similar. The defendant who assaults a
pregnant woman causing the death of the fetus she is carrying
destroys the fetus without the consent of the woman. This is not
the same as the woman who elects to have her pregnancy
terminated by one legally authorized to perform the act ....
Roe v. Wade protects the woman's right of choice; it does not
protect, much less confer on an assailant, a third-party unilateral
right to destroy the fetus)6
Predictably, the defendant in Merrill also cited the incongruity between
the criminal statutes in question and the Supreme Court's ruling that an
unborn child is not a person for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The state court, however, exposed the flawed logic of this
argument by framing both Roe and the case in question in the context of
the competing state interest in the preservation of human life. The court
cited the Supreme Court's reasoning that "the right in Roe v. Wade can be
understood only by considering both the woman's interest and the nature
of the State's interference with it."' ' Moreover, Roe v. Wade noted that
the state "has still another important and legitimate interest in protecting
the potentiality of human life.' 69 Thus, the Merril court concluded that
the fetal homicide statutes seek to protect the potentiality of human life,
and "they do so without impinging directly or indirectly on a pregnant
woman's privacy rights."'"7
As to the defendant's void for vagueness argument, the court
considered whether the laws failed to give fair warning of the prohibited
conduct and thus encouraged arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
The defendant contended that it was unfair to impose on the murderer of
a woman an additional penalty for murder of her unborn child when
165. Id.
166. Id. at 321-322.
167. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
168. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 322 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473
(1977)).
169. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
170. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 322.
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neither the assailant nor the pregnant woman may have been aware of the171
pregnancy. However, as the court stated, "[t]he fair warning rule has
never been understood to excuse criminal liability simply because the
defendant's victim proves not to be the victim the defendant had in
mind.' 72 Applying the doctrine of transferred intent, the court easily
dismissed this claim:
Because the offender did not intend to kill the particular victim,
indeed, may not even have been aware of that victim's presence,
does not mean that the offender did not have fair warning that
he would be held criminally accountable the same as if the
victim had been the victim intended .... The possibility that a
female homicide victim of childbearing age may be pregnant is a
possibility that an assaulter may not safely exclude.
The court inferred that, in an assault on, or murder of, a pregnant woman,
the mother and unborn child were similar enough that the requisite intent
to commit the crime against the mother was logically transferable to the
unborn child.
The court also addressed the defendant's void for vagueness challenge
on the grounds that the statute left uncertain when death occurs and life
begins. The defendant argued that causing the "death" of an embryo
assumes that the embryo must first be "living," thus begging the question
of when "life" begins and when "death" occurs.174 The court, however,
interpreted the defendant's position as raising the issue of when life as a
human being begins or ends.'75 The Minnesota statute did not require that
the embryo inside the mother be considered a person or a human being.
The court held that the state needed only to prove that the embryo or the
fetus in the mother's womb "was living, that it had life, and that it has life
no longer."1 76 Therefore, in finding that the state had met its burden of
proof for all elements of the crime, the court held that the Minnesota
Crimes Against Unborn Children Act was not void for vagueness and
affirmed the defendant's conviction for the murder of his partner's
171. Id. at 323.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 324; See Chabot, supra note 43.
174. Merril, 450 N.W.2d at 324.
175. Id.
176. Id. The court opined that to "have life" means "to have property of all
living things to grow, to become." Id.
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unborn child.177
The Merrill decision reflects the reasoning used by other courts in
sustaining the validity of statutes protecting the unborn.178 As the court
held, the Minnesota statutes were neither in conflict with the Fourteenth
Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, nor
were they void for vagueness. The legislative intent behind the statute-
the safeguarding of the state's compelling interest in potential human
life-was clear, and did not violate the mother's constitutionally
protected right to procure a post-viability abortion. The Merrill court,
however, was also careful to highlight what this particular case did not
involve:
People are free to differ or abstain on the profound
philosophical and moral questions of whether an embryo is a
human being, or on whether or at what stage the embryo or
fetus is ensouled or acquires "personhood." These questions are
entirely irrelevant to criminal liability under the statute ....
Defendant wishes to argue that causing the death of a living
embryo or nonviable fetus in the mother's womb should not be
made a crime. This is an argument, however, that must be
addressed by the legislature. Our role in the judicial branch is
limited solely to whether the legislature has defined a crime
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., People v. Ford, 581 N.E.2d 1189 (Ill. 1991). In Ford, the
Appellate Court of Illinois upheld the defendant's conviction for intentional
homicide of an unborn child. The defendant was found to have stomped or kicked
the stomach of his seventeen year old stepdaughter who was five and a half
months pregnant at the time, thereby causing the death of her unborn child. Id. at
1190. Similar to Minnesota, Illinois defines "unborn child" as "any individual of
the human species from fertilization until birth." 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/9-
1.2(b) (West 1993). The court held that the state's important and legitimate
interest in protecting potentiality of human life is a valid legislative purpose
justifying the fetal homicide statute even if physicians who perform abortions at
the choice of pregnant women are treated differently from third parties who act
intentionally against unborn children without the consent of the mother. Ford, 581
N.E.2d at 1199. Therefore, the fetal homicide statute did not violate the equal
protection clause. Id. Moreover, the court also held that the trier of fact in a case
involving fetal homicide need only decide whether the entity within the mother's
womb once had life which was snuffed out by the acts of the defendant, and not
whether this entity was a "person" or "human being." Id. at 1201. Citing much of
the logic employed by the court in Merril, the court in Ford held that the fetal
homicide statute did not violate the due process clause. Id. at 1202.
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within constitutional parameters.179
In other words, the judiciary is not the proper forum to argue the logic or
the reason behind a constitutionally valid statute. Whatever one might
think of the wisdom of a particular statute, courts should not allow
philosophical or religious interpretations to govern the legitimacy of an
otherwise constitutional measure.
V. SUPPORT FOR THE UNBORN VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE ACT
Two basic assumptions underlie current federal legislative efforts to
protect the unborn. First, that the unborn will be born; and second, that
the unborn will have a chance to live out their full potential. It appears
unlikely, however, that the United States will ever see a federal
manifestation of prevalent state policy protecting the unborn. Despite the
overwhelming majority of Americans who support a federal fetal crime
law, the controversial abortion debate has stalled enactment of the
Unborn Victims of Violence. Since the landmark decision of Roe v. Wade,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed a woman's constitutionally
protected right to procure an abortion.'O An analysis of the Court's
179. Merril, 450 N.W.2d at 324.
180. See Planned Parenthood of Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Stenberg v.
Cahart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). In the complicated decision of Casey, the Court
concluded that consideration of the fundamental constitutional question resolved
by Roe, principles of constitutional integrity and the rule of stare decisis require
that Roe's essential three-part holding be affirmed. First, a woman must be able to
choose to have an abortion prior to fetal viability without undue interference from
the state, whose interests are not strong enough to support a complete prohibition
of abortion or the imposition of substantial obstacles to the woman's effective
right to elect the procedure. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. Second, the state may restrict
the practice of abortion after fetal viability if the law contains exceptions for
pregnancies endangering a woman's life or health. Id. Third, the state retains a
legitimate interest from the outset of pregnancy in protecting the health of the
woman and the life of the fetus. Id. However, the Court also held that Roe's rigid
trimester framework should be rejected, and that the state may enact measures to
further its interest in potential life so long as these measures do not constitute an
undue burden on the woman's right to choose an abortion. Moreover, measures
designed to advance this interest should not be invalidated merely because their
purpose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion. Id. at 873-
874.
In Stenberg, the Court held that a Nebraska statute criminalizing the performance
of partial-birth abortions violated the constitution, as interpreted by Roe and
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treatment of abortion as a protected right under the Fourteenth
Amendment, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
Critics who perceive the Unborn Victims of Violence Act as a threat to
a woman's right to procure an abortion is fundamentally flawed for three
reasons. First, the Act specifically exempts abortion-related conduct from
its scope. Nothing in the Act may be construed to permit the prosecution
of any person for conduct relating to a consensual abortion. Such consent
may be given by the mother, or may be implied by law under medical
circumstances. Neither the mother nor the treating physician are subject
to the Act's penalties.
Second, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act is in fact congruous with
the tenets of Roe v. Wade. The Supreme Court has addressed the right to
an abortion by balancing the competing interests of two parties, the
mother and the state."' Although the state may have a compelling interest
in protecting potential human life, it may regulate the practice of abortion
only if no undue burden is placed on the mother's ability to exercise her
choice.1 2 Roe v. Wade, in essence, subordinates the interests of all third
Casey. The process of partial-birth abortion involves-when performed at twelve
to twenty-four weeks of the pregnancy-dilation of the cervix, removal of at least
some of the fetal tissue, and possibly the potential need for instrumental
dismemberment of the fetus to facilitate its evacuation from the uterus. The
statute in question in Stenberg prohibited any partial-birth abortion unless the
procedure was necessary to save the mother's life. It did not, however, contain an
exception for the preservation of the mother's health. Because doctors differ in
their estimations of the health risks involved in partial-birth abortion as well as in
their estimations of whether partial-birth abortion is in fact safer than other
alternatives, the Court concluded that the statute endangers a woman's health
when it regulates the method of abortion.
181. See generally Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)(states are not free, under the guise of
protecting maternal health or potential life, to intimidate women into continuing
pregnancies); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979)(striking down as
unconstitutionally vague a Pennsylvania statute requiring every person who
performs an abortion to make a determination "based on his experience,
judgment or professional competence" that the fetus is not viable); Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973)(striking down as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment a
Georgia law requiring that abortions be performed in a hospital accredited by a
state committee, that the procedure be approved by the hospital staff abortion
committee, and that the performing physician's judgment be confirmed by
independent examinations of the patient by two other licensed physicians).
182. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
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parties to the interest of the woman with regard to abortion. Clearly,
criminal laws punishing those who disregard this fundamentally
established rule of law by terminating a woman's pregnancy against her
will reinforce this logic. The decision to carry a child should be exercised
by a woman and her treating physician and not by a third party. As
pointed out by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Merrill, "Roe v. Wade
protects the woman's right of choice; it does not protect, much less confer
on an assailant, a third-party unilateral right to destroy the fetus."'83
Finally, nothing in the Act can reasonably be argued to constitute an
undue burden on a woman's right to have an abortion. Having specifically
exempted abortion-related conduct from the scope of the Act, Congress
has kept within the parameters established by Roe and its progeny. It is
implausible to assert that an Act which safeguards the legality of a
woman's right to abort a fetus may at the same time weaken the reasoning
upon which this constitutionally protected right rests.
The Roe v. Wade decision encompasses two basic principles regarding
crimes against the fetus.' 8' First, the Court declared only that the fetus was
not a person for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. Outside the
Fourteenth Amendment, a state may recognize or confer the right of
personhood upon an unborn child. Second, where the state's interest in
protecting potential human life is not outweighed by the individual's
constitutionally protected rights, state law protection of a fetus could
easily prevail.'8 6 Congress has logically and constitutionally applied these
principles to its police powers under federal law with the Unborn Victims
of Violence Act.
CONCLUSION
The proposed Unborn Victims of Violence Act would criminalize
various acts resulting in death or bodily injury to the unborn. While this
measure may be unprecedented as a matter of federal law, it has a strong
foundation in state law. The common law has changed significantly since
the days of Coke and Blackstone, and legal understanding of the unborn
(1992).
183. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 322.
184. See Jeffrey A. Parness, Crimes Against the Unborn: Protecting and
Respecting the Potentiality of Human Life, 22 HARV. J. ON LEG 97, 112 (1985).
185. See id. at 112.
186. See id.
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child has slowly evolved from viewing it as a biological extension of the
mother, to seeing it as a separate and distinct being. For purposes of
criminal law, most jurisdictions have abandoned the once prevalent
theory that causing the death of an unborn child can not be a crime. Many
states today impose some type of criminal liability on causing the death of
an unborn child, although these states differ as to the gestational period at
which such liability attaches. Moreover, as illustrated by the Merrill case,
courts have had little trouble sustaining these measures on constitutional
grounds. For all of these reasons, Congress should reconsider its position
and enact a federal fetal protection law like the Unborn Victims of
Violence Act so that all human life - born and unborn - may truly
enjoy the protection of law.
